

## UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA BARBARA

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SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS

SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA 93106

November 2, 1981

Dear 

STAT

This is the letter I promised you at the last DSB meeting, where your comments reminded me how much we all depend upon intelligence as a stabilizing factor in this miserable world. Allow me a couple of (hopefully helpful) remarks, stimulated by your talk. Did I tell you what Aldous Huxley said about the definition of intelligence?

The first point was your comment about the possible establishment of an NIO for technology, which is an old subject. We all know that the intelligence product in areas affected by technology suffers, at times dreadfully, from lack of sufficient contact with the Blue community. (The most egregious example I know is of a Service intelligence agency that made a mistake of sixteen orders of magnitude in an estimate, and has not, to this day, acknowledged it.) My problem is that this kind of weakness is not a weakness in assessing foreign technology, but rather in the technological underpinnings of other assessments. There are many examples. This suggests that what is needed is not so much an NIO as a scientific and technological editor or ombudsman, to keep the "system" clean.

Some years ago, I recall that we had a small panel that worked with a particular part of the Agency, simply listening with interest to what was going on. Though there were hardly ever any reports (to the dismay of the auditors), we were told that the whole operation justified itself through the opportunity for management to watch the troops perform in front of a critical but friendly audience. Obviously, that is not an ideal format, but some such service is needed, simply because the Agency can't have the finest scientists and engineers in the country.

I'm aware that there are people who find what is loosely called "peer review" objectionable, for two reasons. One is the perceived affront to the ego, and that can be dismissed in deference to the greater good. The other is a genuine

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concern, particularly on sensitive matters, about trusting the outside world. I guess that I have trouble giving that one too much credit, since I know of very few security breaches attributable to scientists, and all too many attributable to people in the security system. Nonetheless, we are all concerned about security, and I know that I, for one, would be perfectly willing to be polygraphed, if that's what it took to improve interplay.

In fact, I know that I mentioned to you that, up to a few years ago, I used to carry an Agency badge, which was extremely useful. I used to make a point of dropping in for an hour or so when the opportunity arose, or on the way to the airport, or whatever. Alas, Admiral Turner lifted the badges of such as me, by setting a very high visit rate as the criterion for issuance. The result is that it is now a bit of a fuss to make a visit, especially to visit a few people, and it isn't worth it for a short exchange. I recognize that that was precisely the intent, but believe (with all due respect) that the Admiral didn't understand the value of peer interchange in assuring quality control.

The upshot is that, in my view, there has long been a need for some mechanism for enhancing the technological quality of the product, and this is likely to come best from a more comfortable format for interaction with the (trustworthy) outside world. Where this has been done ad hoc it has often been quite successful (the A Team/B Team exercise, and some that Bobby Inman knows jump to mind), but issues important enough to rate that kind of attention are the exception.

On a completely different subject, you mentioned the magic word "proliferation". You may not know that I am on the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, was on the President's Nuclear Safety Oversight Committee (which vanished with the fiscal year), have chaired several non-defense nuclear-related studies, am deeply involved in matters of nuclear power, and care mightily about proliferation. In short, have knowledge, will travel.

I know I mentioned to you that I had threatened to drop in on Adm. Inman, to try to make a constructive input on some of these matters, and the threat is still alive. If it works out, I'll also try to visit you.

*Cheers,  
Hal Lewis*

Executive Record  
81-5196/3

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

5 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM :

[Redacted]

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

STAT

SUBJECT : Senior Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology

1. Harold Agnew is coming in to see you on Wednesday, 7 October, at 10:30 a.m. I did not suggest any specific job to him but merely a desire to explore mutual interests. Since he was going to be in the building anyway, this was convenient for him.

2. I think we can defer the question of instrumentality until we have had a talk with him.

[Redacted]

STAT

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
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### Remarks:

To 17: Please provide a response to DCI's question in paragraph 2.

D/Executive Secretary  
1 October 1981  
Date



30 September 1981

NTAC 6258-81

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Senior Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology

1. Harold Agnew seems to me to be the best of those listed  
in  memo of 28 September.

2. I think we should move on the subjects in the paper of  
24 September but haven't decided what instrumentality would be  
best. What are your views?

*for* William J. Casey

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

5 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM :

[REDACTED]


Chairman, National Intelligence Council

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